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Syndicated News from AngolaAngola to host 62nd of WHO/AFRO Regional CommitteeDate Added: Fri, 03 Sep 2010 12:34:28 GMT+00:00
Angola face Uganda at traditional stadiumDate Added: Fri, 03 Sep 2010 09:44:01 GMT+00:00
Angolan physician explains Cipriano s absence in match against AustraliaDate Added: Fri, 03 Sep 2010 10:58:54 GMT+00:00
Angola to play US on MondayDate Added: Fri, 03 Sep 2010 10:48:10 GMT+00:00
Angola play Australia for group A's third positionDate Added: Thu, 02 Sep 2010 09:45:49 GMT+00:00
Basketball player pledges dedication against USDate Added: Fri, 03 Sep 2010 11:48:25 GMT+00:00
Government paid 60 per cent of public debtDate Added: Fri, 03 Sep 2010 20:38:33 GMT+00:00
Angola; Over 2000 pilgrims already in MuximaDate Added: Thu, 02 Sep 2010 20:56:21 GMT+00:00
IOM presents strategic planning for 2010/2011Date Added: Fri, 03 Sep 2010 14:22:58 GMT+00:00
Pension funds reach USD 320 millionDate Added: Fri, 03 Sep 2010 17:49:16 GMT+00:00
Results 1 - 10 of 2 Headlines for Angola
Angola HeadlinesResults Page: 1,CHINA’S 21ST CENTURY AFRICA POLICY EVOLVINGDate Added: Wednesday, August 7th, 2002Contributed by: RCN Administrator
China has long had a close strategic relationship with Africa, and this relationship is evolving in the 21st century in light of Beijing’s new goals. China’s Africa policy is paying off to a great degree: Beijing enjoys advantages on the continent that few other nations possess.
Analysis From military assistance and oil projects in Libya, Sudan and Egypt, to close diplomatic relations with South Africa, China has aggressively pursued a foreign policy that allows for greater strategic cooperation between the world’s largest population and nations north and south of the Sahara. China’s already well-established investment in and diplomatic links with African nations have risen steadily since the Middle Kingdom’s economy began expanding rapidly a decade ago. While the West predominantly sought markets in and closer relations with burgeoning nations in Central Europe as well as prospering South American and East Asian countries, Beijing cast its eyes on Africa. In Africa, Beijing sees opportunities to expand its markets, augment its diplomatic strength, diversify its energy resources and project power. Because it is able to capitalize on its own unique history as a developing nation, and is willing to overlook any ethical dilemmas in its political ties, Beijing finds itself in a unique position in doing business on the continent. Beijing’s economic aid to African countries extends as far back as the 1950s. As Moscow and Washington battled for the world’s hearts and purse strings during the Cold War, China offered a third alternative to countries seeking partners, painting itself as a fellow victim of colonialism and a leader of the developing world. Over the last five decades, Beijing has developed close ties with African nations primarily as a way to develop a diplomatic power base and a market for its state-owned enterprises. It has provided 53 African countries with various kinds of aid, including economic grants, interest-free loans and preferential loans. By 2000 more than 640 Chinese-aided projects in agriculture, energy, transportation, textiles, machinery, construction engineering, water conservation, electrical power, broadcast and telecommunications had been completed in Africa. The lion’s share of Beijing’s economic and diplomatic efforts still goes toward its relations with the United States and its efforts to alleviate its East Asian neighbors’ fears about China’s economic and political dominance. South Africa, China’s largest trading partner in Africa, ranks only 25th in bilateral trade volume. However, Beijing is willing to spend a proportionally larger amount of political and economic capital in Africa than most other powers. China’s modus operandi for developing relations with countries it deems strategically significant is well established. Like any large power, China engages in development projects, military assistance programs and bilateral trade in order to foster cooperation with and, later, dependence on Beijing. China’s strategic interest in Africa is still the same in the 21st century, but its goals have evolved. In the first 50 years of the Chinese Communist dynasty, it leaders’ priority was the country’s survival and building the foundation for growth. Now that this goal has been fairly well accomplished, new tasks are at hand. Gaining new market share is a pressing need for Beijing as it endeavors to transform from socialist central planning to a market economy. Although China is flooding the world with everything from sneakers and toys to computer chips, mostly these are products from new foreign joint-venture factories. Africa offers a large market for old Chinese state-owned enterprises that are hemorrhaging money and need customers for their largely inferior products. The African market is not large enough to keep the companies from losing money, but it does help stanch the bleeding until the firms are revitalized or allowed to die. Even more of a concern for China is diversifying its energy resources. In 1993 China became a net importer of oil, with imports comprising approximately 20 percent of its consumption (a figure slated by some experts to grow to 40 percent by 2010). Currently the majority of Chinese foreign oil comes from the Middle East. However, Beijing would like to trim its dependence on the volatile region. Among the countries in Africa from which China imports oil are Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Algeria, Gabon, Cameroon, Libya and Egypt. Unlike many foreign companies that are unwilling to risk extracting oil on the African mainland and prefer drilling offshore, Chinese firms have no qualms about going in-country. Sudan serves as an excellent example of China’s strategy and goals in the region. In exchange for oil and a strategic ally on the Red Sea, Beijing has worked hand-in-glove with the government in Khartoum. Sino-Sudanese economic cooperation dates back to the 1970s, and according to Chinese figures, Beijing has given up to $780 million to Sudan in economic aid and implemented more than 30 projects, including the 300-megawatt-capacity Kajbar Dam project. In addition to undertaking numerous industrial and infrastructure projects, China has become one of Sudan’s main weapons suppliers. Reports indicate that China has supplied everything from small arms to mortars, SCUD missiles, helicopters and fighter jets. The oil cooperation between China and Sudan began in 1995, with China Oil and Gas Corp.’s investment of more than $440 million in Sudan’s Sumuglad oil field. China’s allotted share of the production, which came on line in 1999, is a maximum of 15 million barrels per year. Beijing hopes to foster better relations with Nigeria and Angola along the same vein as its relationship with Sudan. Nigeria has estimated oil reserves of 22.5 billion barrels, and Angola’s reserves are estimated currently at 12.5 billion barrels and growing. This year China has inked deals to undertake large public works projects in both countries, which are desperate for investment and assistance in non-hydrocarbon sectors. In March 2002, the China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Co. and the Shandong Power Construction Co. were contracted to build and operate two gas-fired power plants in the southwestern state of Ondo, Nigeria. The project’s cost is estimated at $390 million. In Angola, Beijing pledged July 29 to grant aid worth $90 million to help Luanda Railways rebuild the war-torn country’s decimated transportation infrastructure. As part of another deal in May, Shanghai Bell (a U.S.-Chinese joint venture) and Angolan Telecommunication Co. signed a contract valued at $60 million. Shanghai Bell will expand and optimize the telecommunications network in south and east Angola. But China’s diplomatic concerns in Africa have evolved from trying to win friends and secure markets to developing strategic, long-term relations with regional powers on the continent. From north to south and east to west, Beijing has played its cards deftly. South Africa, Sudan, Nigeria and Egypt -- China’s four largest trading partners in 2001 -- all offer tactical advantages in their respective regions. In the south, China enjoys a close relationship with regional powerhouse South Africa, which is the largest and most advanced economy on the continent. Beijing’s relationship with Pretoria stretches back to its support of Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress while it fought a guerrilla campaign against the country’s apartheid government. In 1997 Mandela demonstrated his appreciation after assuming the presidency by dropping South Africa’s longstanding diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favor of the mainland. Today, with bilateral trade topping $2 billion a year, South Africa is China’s largest trade partner on the continent. And ties to the government in South Africa offer Beijing a large amount of political influence in the sub-Saharan region. In the north, Egypt has long had a solid relationship with China. In 1956 Egypt was one of the first non-Soviet-bloc nations to recognize Beijing, and that relationship has expanded now to include greater mutual strategic concerns. Egypt is China’s third-largest trading partner in Africa, and as a conduit to the Arab world and guardian of the Suez Canal, it is an important economic and political hub for Chinese interests. Economically, the development of port facilities and tourism are key areas of cooperation between Cairo and Beijing. Hong Kong-based Hutchinson Whampoa, which reportedly is connected to the Chinese Liberation Army, is developing facilities in the Port of Said on the Easter Suez. The port services in the Suez will serve as an important transit for the Chinese commercial and military fleet and will provide Cairo with needed infrastructure investment as it drives to transform itself into a modern transfer hub for goods and services between Europe, Africa and Asia. Tourism also is increasing the amount of economic activity between the two countries. Beijing, which promotes only a few nations around the world as acceptable tourist destinations for its growing middle class, agreed in October 2001 to add Egypt to the list. Egypt relies heavily on tourism as a source of foreign exchange, and China’s designation will be a boon for the nation’s tourism industry. Beijing also is cementing continent-wide relations with nations that can help it project power in the 21st century. China is slowly but steadily expanding and upgrading its navy, including acquiring Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers. As the navy pursues a truly global reach, it will need ports of call for logistics support -- warships already have docked in Tanzania and Egypt in July 2000 and June 2002, respectively. Along the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean, Beijing has developed ties with countries that can deliver this support and will continue to do so. China has been able to penetrate and capitalize on African political and economic resources better than other nations because of the singular comparative advantages it enjoys that no other large power possesses. First and foremost, China is not hampered by the colonial legacy in Africa that hinders European governments. In contrast, Beijing can more justifiably claim unity in the developing world’s condemnation of perceived Western exploitation. This helps a great deal to alleviate suspicion and help Chinese diplomats get their foot in the door. Not only does China have a more "politically correct" background as far as African politicians are concerned, but Beijing also does not reserve the moral high ground that Europe and the United States take on human rights issues. Thus it is not difficult for Chinese firms to contract deals with nations like Libya, Sudan or Angola. What’s more, Beijing has shown greater interest in its African allies than the West has. While U.S. and European investors are primarily interested in only the most lucrative enterprises -- like oil and diamonds -- China has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in African infrastructure. From port facilities, rail links, power plants, telecommunications facilities and weapons factories, Chinese companies are working on projects in Africa that most Western firms would shy away from. Occasionally the investments may show a decent cash return, but more often than not they are mainly meant to help Beijing gain influence in a particular country. This high degree of economic cooperation, combined with the largely positive Chinese experience of transforming its own economy, has impressed a generation of African leaders who themselves are looking for new models and policies applicable to their developing nations. African leaders are attracted to Beijing’s ability to maintain tight political and social control while simultaneously drawing record levels of foreign direct investment and withstanding continued Washington hostility. In addition, Chinese interest on the continent provides leverage against U.S. and European influence. If South Africa, Nigeria or Egypt are unsatisfied with the extent of cooperation Washington is offering in the economic or military spheres, they can not-so-subtly use China as a lever in negotiations. Producing only 2.5 percent of global GDP, Africa is not nor ever will be a powerhouse ally for Beijing. However, there are short-term and long-term strategic objectives that Africa can help Beijing to meet. Chinese influence in Africa continues to grow in proportion to its own economic strength, and if it is able to maintain its impressive expansion, Africa will become a pillar in Beijing’s ability to project power on a global scale.Results Page: EX-REBELS JOIN ANGOLA’S ARMYDate Added: Monday, July 15th, 2002Contributed by: RCN Administrator
A rebel army which once controlled more than half of Angola will officially cease to exist by the end of the week.
Angolan army officers have been selecting 5,000 members of the Unita rebel movement to be incorporated into the Angolan Armed Forces, in accordance with the peace agreement signed in April. Angola timeline 1975: Independence from Portugal Power struggle between Cuba-backed MPLA and Unita, backed by South Africa and the US 1992: Dos Santos wins presidential poll 1992 Savimbi rejects results 1995: First UN peacekeepers arrive 1998: Full-scale fighting resumes Feb 2002: Savimbi killed April 2002: Ceasefire signed The process of integrating these men into the army is due to last from Monday to Friday. On Saturday, the Unita soldiers not selected will formally be discharged. But in practical terms, this process may not be as dramatic as the plan would suggest. At the moment, all of the Unita soldiers and their families - over 300,000 people in total - are living in quartering camps around the country. For most of these people, there is no immediate prospect of leaving. The programmes which were promised to help Unita families to reintegrate into civilian life are still only being talked about. Political polarisation The camps will still be controlled internally by ex-Unita officers, even though overall responsibility now passes from the army to the government’s reconciliation commission. Most of Unita’s weapons are by now meant to have been handed to the armed forces. But there is no independent audit of this process, and the Unita camps do retain some weapons, supposedly for their own security. The camps were set up under the peace accord The quartering camps were meant to be temporary structures, but there are fears that they may end up becoming permanent settlements exclusively for Unita supporters, and thus perpetuate the political polarisation in the country. The task of reconciliation is one area where the United Nations hopes it might be able to play a role. The mandate of the UN mission in Angola expires on Monday, and in the coming weeks the Security Council will be discussing a new role for the UN in a political environment which has changed radically since the death of Jonas Savimbi. With the government and Unita having pressed ahead with their own peace agreement, the UN is not expecting any major role in the demobilisation process. But UN officials in Luanda are hopeful that it may play a role in human rights monitoring. |
